Introduction
Theorizing on segmented assimilation has usefully spurred debate about the experiences and positions of the so-called 'new second generation' in the US, and more recently, in Europe. While this model has been helpful in illuminating the diversification of integration pathways for different immigrant groups to the USA, it has been criticized by analysts in both the US and Europe along various lines (see Thompson & Crul 2007; Crul & Vermeulen 2003) . The fact that SA theory may not be fully applicable to European cases, however, may be an unreasonable test of its merits, given that it was developed specifically in relation to the incorporation of post 1965 immigrants from mostly Latin America and Asia into the US. Nevertheless, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears that theorizing on segmented assimilation (as exemplified by Portes & Zhou 1993; Rumbaut & Portes 2001 ) is now in need of some refinement.
Segmented assimilation theory has primarily focused on how young people and adolescents fare in secondary schooling and the crucial role of family (and ethnic social networks and resources) in supporting second generation individuals. This theory essentially focuses on the second generation when they are minors and adolescents, subject to their parents' influence and authority within the home. At the heart of this theory is the contention that young people who delay assimilation into the mainstream (and who avert a slippery slide into a minority underclass, or who avoid wholesale Americanization in White suburban settings) are most likely to succeed in secondary schooling and enter onto a trajectory which can ensure educational and socioeconomic success.
The benefits of ethnic retention are said to encourage the second generation in educational achievement and high aspirations, while shielding them from mainstream influences which can weaken coethnic ties and hinder educational achievement. This pathway is exemplified by the case of Cubans in
Miami and Punjabi Sikhs in suburban California (Portes & Zhou 1993) . For example, in 'Valleyside', a rural, predominantly White town in California, Gibson (1989) characterizes the selective assimilation pattern of the Punjabi Sikhs as 'accommodation and acculturation without assimilation'. Gibson observes:
'…most Punjabi Sikh immigrants openly and actively reject the notion that Americanization means giving 'mixed' or not). One limitation of SA theory is the fact that while this theory focuses on second generation minors and adolescents, and how they fare primarily in terms of economic incorporation, it does not attend to the more social aspects of integration, when they leave school and make the transition into young adulthood -a phase of young adulthood where they are typically faced with choices about potential marriage partners, and about the meanings and salience of their ethnic and racial identities more generally.
Despite evidence of ethnic retention in studies such as by Gibson (1989) and Portes & Zhou (1993) , it would appear that parents' emphasis on selective assimilation has not hindered rates of intermarriage for lead second generation individuals into mainstream settings in which they will encounter a variety of possible marriage partners, and will potentially encourage intermarriage.
Current demographic projections in Britain and even the US (according to Lee & Bean 2004, 20% of Americans could identify themselves as multiracial by 2050 -not that distant a future) suggest that while ethnic boundaries will not disappear overnight, they will grow ever more complex and blurred (Parker & 
Intermarriage and upward mobility in Britain?
Intermarriage is regarded by many analysts as the ultimate litmus test of 'integration' (see Warner & Srole 1945; Gordon 1964; Alba & Nee 2003; Lee & Bean 2004) . Conversely, low rates of intermarriage have often been interpreted as an indicator of the maintenance of strong ethnic identities. Milton Gordon's (1964) book Assimilation in American Life develops an explicit link between the process of 'assimilation' and intermarriage, in which he argues that intermarriage is the inevitable outcome of what he calls 'structural assimilation'. The price of such assimilation, for Gordon, is the disappearance of the ethnic group as a separate entity and the evaporation of its distinctive values' (p. 81).
But as argued by theorists of SA, one can achieve upward mobility on the basis of limited acculturation -i.e. one can de-couple economic and social forms of assimilation -and that selective acculturation is conducive for upward mobility via adherence to ethnic norms conducive to educational success. While Gordon's study is dated, and largely focused on European immigrants to the USA (plus 'Negroes' and Puerto Ricans), his theoretical linking of intermarriage and integration has not been revised 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Bradford 2006:24) . Clearly, this finding goes against the implicit logic of assimilation, in which intermarriage with Whites would normally be associated with upward mobility. The opposite is true for South Asian/White mixed people, with a higher proportion of this group in the professions, in comparison with either South
Asian or White Britons -here, it would appear that those who are intermarried are a more elite subgroup of South Asians. In fact, those who identified as White/South Asian were the most likely to be in managerial or professional occupations (30%), while those with White/Black Caribbean identities were the least likely to be in those occupations (20%) (Bradford 2006) . Furthermore, those who were Black Caribbean/White were the most likely to be unemployed (16%), while South Asian/White mixed people were the least likely (10%). Therefore, disparate types of 'mixed' people exhibit different socioeconomic profiles. Thus, while
Black/White intermarriage is most prevalent in Britain, it appears that Black/White mixed individuals are the most disadvantaged in socioeconomic terms, while South Asians are the least likely to intermarry, but those who do intermarry are likely to have children who are more privileged than other groups.
Based on the figures above (though analysts are not entirely in agreement), there appears to be some evidence that the projected scenario in SA (in the US), in which Black second generation groups are particularly vulnerable to a downward trajectory, may be at least partially replicated among mixed Black/White Britons (in terms of their employment profile), even though they are the 'products' of intermarriage. Historically, the White working classes have partnered with the Black working class in 
Identifications of 'mixed race' young people in Britain
Because intermarriage is believed to decrease the significance of cultural distinctiveness in future generations, the children of such unions are less likely to identify themselves with a single ethnic or racial group. A number of studies in the US (see Rockequemore & Brunsma 2002; DaCosta 2007; Root 1996) and UK (Tizard & Phoenix 1993; Ifekwunigwe 1998; Ali 2003) have already demonstrated the emergence of multiracial identifications, which are distinctive from monoracial or monoethnic The 'other mixed' category is heterogeneous, with many different identities, including mixed White ethnic identities. However, these numbers are almost certainly an undercount, with some parents designating their young children monoracially (Bradford 2006) , as opposed to a multiracial categorization (see Xie & Goyette 1997) .
I now draw upon some of the findings of an Economic and Social Research Council funded study of the racial identifications of different types of 'mixed race' young people in Britain, including Black/White, East Asian/White, Arab/White, South Asian/White, and minority mix (e.g. Black/Asian). iv We adopted a cross-sectional study design, with the use of a semistructured online survey, followed by in-depth interviews with a sub-set of these survey respondents. Young adults were recruited from universities and colleges of further education across England (but primarily from London). v A stratified sample (based on location and size of the mixed race student population) was drawn from a sampling frame that integrated ethnicallycoded data for students in universities and colleges supplied by the Higher Education Statistics
Agency and the Learning and Skills Council. These institutions sent out an email (with a link to our online survey) to its student body. We were able to include 326 of the roughly 500 surveys returned to us. Survey respondents were asked a variety of open and close-ended questions about their ethnic and racial identifications. Of these 326 survey respondents, we obtained a sub-sample of 65 young people for in-depth interviews (27 men, 38 women). vi Respondents in the sub-sample of 65 were then interviewed about their understandings and experiences of their racial and ethnic identifications in more detail -usually within 1 to 2 months after the completion of the online survey. In response to the instruction to choose one group, respondents used a variety of racial and ethnonational terms which I included under one category. Almost half of the interview sample (33 of 65) chose terms such as 'White' (11), 'British' (10), 'White British' (6), 'European' (3), 'Irish'
(2), and 'English' (1). Although terms such as 'White', 'British', 'European' and 'Irish' are not equivalent terms, they were grouped together, because, as I explain below, these respondents conveyed very similar meanings through the use of these terms.
A striking 15 of 16 of the East Asian/White respondents, most of the South Asian/White respondents (8 of 10), and just over half (8 of 15) of the Arab/White respondents chose terms within this category -as opposed to only 2 of 17 Black/White, and no 'minority mix'
respondents. So how should we interpret these chosen identifications? We found that most of he did not want to be seen as foreign, and the meanings attributed to his putative foreignness made him feel objectified and devalued. Thus phenoytpe was central to how mixed respondents were able to choose and assert their ethnic options, including the extent to which their chosen identifications were validated by others (Waters 1990).
While some respondents experienced their mixedness in primarily positive ways, others' experiences were less positive. Clearly, group differences applied in terms of which types of mixed people felt that they could claim a White or British identity. East Asian/White and South Asian/White (and to a lesser extent, Arab/White) respondents were the most likely to claim Black/White respondents talked about the importance of having their mixed status recognized; this was because many people (of all backgrounds) would see them as monoracially Black. This forced inclusion into the collective category 'Black' meant that they had to deny their White heritage (see Zack 1996) . All 6 of the Black/White respondents claiming a multiracial identity were women.
While we cannot explore this finding more fully in this paper, it may be that part Black men are even more normatively constrained from claiming a mixed heritage than are women. Interestingly, while Black/White respondents were most consistently racially assigned by others (as Black), they were also the most likely to claim a multiracial, as opposed to a monoracial, identification. Many of the respondents who insisted upon a mixed identification articulated some of the most impassioned views about the centrality of their mixedness, to their sense of selves.
Conclusion
Despite various criticisms, theorizing on segmented assimilation has been invaluable in documenting the differential pathways taken by various second generation groups. However, as the new second generation has matured, we need to explore what happens when second generation young people leave home, and enter into mainstream settings, where they will make choices about friendships and encounter potential marriage partners. Thus, in this paper, I have first discussed the implications of intermarriage in Britain for the potential integration and mobility of minority young people. Second, I have examined the question of how multiracial (as opposed to monoracial minority) young people in Britain identify themselves, and what these identifications tell us about their senses of belonging in Britain.
As I have argued above, evidence about the socioeconomic positions and experiences of intermarried couples in Britain is still emerging, and the dividends of intermarriage may vary for disparate groups of variable class and educational backgrounds. While some analysts argue that Black/White unions (which are most common in Britain) are just as likely for individuals with little as well as high levels of educational attainment, others argue that educational attainment is inversely related to the propensity to intermarry in the case of Black Britons (unlike the case of South Asian and Chinese Britons). In Britain, it White or British as their 'best single race', and in doing so, were making assertions, not about being White racially, but about belonging in Britain. Overall, these multiracial respondents exemplify a multicultural sensibility in which race-neutral understandings of national belonging are often emphasized in conjunction with, or as being more important than, a recognition of ethnic and racial identity derived from one's parentage. However, assertions of belonging, or of being British, were not always validated by others, especially for some respondents who were seen as visibly different.
Our Black/White respondents differed from our non-Black respondents in their greater propensity to choose a minority race (Black). However, most of those who chose Black also professed to feeling British, and while a few respondents associated their choice with a disadvantaged minority status, most made positive and symbolic assertions of their Black heritage. There was also a surprising degree of diversity even among Black/White respondents, including the significant number of women who insisted upon a multiracial identification, and those who refused a racial designation altogether. It is clear that class background and resources will continue to play an important role in mediating one's experiences of multiraciality, perhaps most significantly in relation to Black/White individuals, given the substantial growth in Black/White mixed people in Britain across both working and middle class backgrounds. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
